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BEYOND PERSECUTORY IMPULSE AND HUMANISING TRACE: 
ON DIDIER FASSIN’S THE WILL TO PUNISH 
Alan Norrie 
Warwick Law School 
 
 
Developed from the Tanner foundation lectures for 2016, The Will to Punish is a one hundred page 
essay which draws upon the author’s perspectives as an anthropologist, an ethnographer, and a 
genealogist in the mode of Foucault and more especially Nietzsche to consider the nature of 
punishment in modern western, capitalist, societies. The argument was developed alongside the 
contributions of three North American-based scholars of the penal system, Bruce Western, Rebecca 
McLennan and David Garland, and it provides a punchy, challenging, vision of modern criminal 
justice and punishment from a critical point of view. It is organised around three basic questions: 
what is punishment? why does one punish? And who gets punished? There is a degree of overlap 
between the answers to these questions, since the what, the why and the who are necessarily 
connected, but overall, the framework of the lectures enables Fassin to launch a set of arguments 
that, while not necessarily novel, nicely bring out the different angles on orthodox positions that a 
critical perspective offers. It could be said to provide something of a state of the art summation of 
the general lines of critical thought, raising questions about critical method, what has been achieved, 
and what else there is still to do. 
The Limits of Analytical Theory 
The lectures commence with a prologue designed to show how in the face of anthropological and 
contemporary evidence, what we conventionally think of as the essential link between crime and 
punishment is not at all obvious. This is the prelude to a series of questions, which begins with the 
framing of the question ‘what is punishment?’ in the influential work of the analytical, normative, 
legal theorist, HLA Hart. Hart produced five criteria for punishment, which when present identified 
the modal and legitimate use of the term. The primary aim of Hart’s argument was to analyse in 
what circumstances it was morally and politically acceptable for a state to allocate pain in a society, 
and how to translate such pain into a legitimate social form, that of punishment. The main elements 
in Hart’s answer had to do with law, which could identify the nature of an offence and an offender, 
and of an authority within a legal system who could apply punishments appropriately to offenders 
for their offences. 
Fassin’s argument is that when one looks at what happens in penal systems, such as that of the 
United States or France (where he has conducted substantial fieldwork), one finds that the 
seemingly neutral and formal configuration of offender, offence and authority are all called into 
question by social practices. Anyone who has seen episodes of The Wire or the French police series, 
Engrenages (English: Spiral), will recognise Fassin’s argument. The police intervene in the social life 
of poor and racially segregated neighbourhoods in a way that pays little or no attention to actual or 
suspected offences, acting rather like an external force of occupation, ‘viewing their public as 
composed of probable enemies and potential criminals’, and feeling entitled to punish ‘with little 
discernment’ (37). Punishment, with or without discernment, is of course not the police’s role 
according to a legal conception. Yet, the magistrates and judges who are supposed to do this, and 
who are disparaged by the police as lenient and law-bound, in fact either carry on the police work of 
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punishing without law, or work suspects through the legal process in ways that accepts the police 
view and is prejudicial to the suspect.  
This latter aspect is most fully developed later in the lectures, where Fassin notes how ‘judges do not 
seem aware of [the non-legal] modus operandi of the public forces’ (106), while they react 
prejudicially to the out of place poor and racially other defendants who come before them. The 
objectification of legal language then permits the judge, apparently, to stand back from his 
subjective perceptions and to be ‘convinced that he has ruled impartially for the common good’ 
(108). These interactions between police, judges and the poor also take place in a broader social and 
political context of calls for law and order, so that the political and institutional system as a whole 
stands behind the flagrantly unfair, non-legal, ways which pervade the criminal process. In this way, 
Fassin argues, modern societies are very far from the legal punishment of the offenders for the 
offence in Hart’s definition. So much the worse for current justice practices, which ought of course 
to be reformed, might be the liberal retort. Fassin’s response to that might be that the modern 
practices are so much part and parcel of a social system predicated on injustice that no calls for 
reforming the part without reform of the whole will succeed. 
In addition to this social critique of the criminal justice system, Fassin wishes to contest the starting 
point of Hart’s analysis: that punishment necessarily involves pain or other unpleasant 
consequences. Here, he adds genealogical enquiry to sociological investigation. Historically and in 
different cultures, the link between harm and wrongdoing on the one hand and crime and 
punishment is not necessarily obvious. Broadly, what we see is a transition that takes place with the 
growth of the western state and capitalist society, with both related to the evolution of theological 
thought. The initial move is from a logic of compensation between individuals or groups to one of 
the infliction of suffering with ‘fiscal and political implications’ (52), and favouring ‘the consolidation 
of kingship’ (53). To this view, Fassin would add the importance of the Christian church, for the 
‘conception of punishment as suffering is … inscribed within a soteriology in which only the infliction 
of pain can give access to redemption and salvation’ (54).  
Here, the position becomes more complex. One might think that Fassin would paint a picture of the 
church in cahoots with the state to help reproduce the kinds of repression masked as legality 
previously described. To some extent, I think that is his view, but there is more at stake here, even if 
it is not quite clear how to grasp it. The birth of the prison has ‘long been presented as both the sign 
and the result of a humanisation of punishment’ (55) which references the ideals of the 
Enlightenment, Beccaria and John Howard, Bentham and the Jacksonian penitentiary. To be sure, 
the nascent prison system would then align with manufacturing capital, as in the nineteenth century 
US prison, and this ‘conspicuous alliance’ of Christian morality, Enlightenment philanthropy and 
early capitalism continued ‘until the end of the nineteenth century, when progressive currents 
succeeded in imposing a vision of the prison system more in conformity with the principles of 
modern democracy’ (56). In all this, there seems to be some interest not just, as Bentham put it, in 
grinding rogues honest, but in ‘a retribution supposed to redeem the offender’ (56). While 
distancing himself from support for this redemptive element in modern penality, Fassin sees it as 
important to ‘acknowledge the relevance of … the trace left by religion in contemporary criminal 
law’ and to consider it ‘from a critical perspective’ (57).  
To do so would be to acknowledge the ongoing influence of a theological-juridical element in a 
system that would otherwise regard itself as secularised, practical and modern. We should think of a 
penal theology as present in aspects such as the individualisation of the sentence (which 
personalises guilt and echoes sin), the infliction of suffering (which reflects the Christian exaltation 
of pain), and the discourse of moral reform (which revives the idea of redemption). Recognising 
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these residues, we both get away from any simple understanding of punishment as the infliction of 
pain (Hart), and in thinking critically about continuities as well as ruptures, glimpse ‘perhaps even 
potentialities for the future’ (58). If all this leaves Hart’s analytical, legal, definition undone, for it is 
evident ‘how intellectually risky and politically problematic’ (59) a definitive answer to the question 
‘What is punishment?’ is, Fassin’s discussion has also opened up the question: where does a critical 
treatment of punishment lead?  
Of course, we could say that where the state and the law leads, the church follows, sanctifying and 
hiding a modern violence. Surely that is part of the story, but it appears not to be all that Fassin 
wants to say. His approach acknowledges some value in a history that involves Enlightenment 
humanitarianism, ‘modern democracy’ and ‘moral reform’, but where do these lead if they are not 
just exalted covers for how the system persecutes those it controls? 
Moral Development and Persecution 
The question intensifies its presence in the second of Fassin’s lectures, on why one punishes. Here, 
he continues with the critique of an a priori (analytical, liberal, normative) account of punishment in 
favour of an a posteriori approach based on an ‘idiographic method’ (64) (i.e., one that is 
sociological, historical, genealogical).  
With regard to punishment’s orthodox self-understanding, Fassin explores its famous dichotomy of 
utilitarianism and retribution, and several aims that fall thereunder. He asks the usual questions 
about incapacitation and deterrence, and comes up with something like the standard social-liberal 
story on rehabilitation. It served as the main justification for incarceration in late nineteenth century 
penal reform movements; then after twentieth century penal welfarism, it experienced a period of 
discredit under conservative ‘nothing works’ criticism, before finding new advocates and studies. 
These suggest rehabilitation’s benefits with regard to recidivism in contrast to traditional punitive 
forms, so that the ‘announcement of its death … appears to have been premature’ (67). Fassin does 
not take this observation further, but in isolating a ‘moral but also educational and social’ (67) 
dimension to punishment through rehabilitation, his comments align with his previous thoughts 
about a theological-juridical dimension to punishment which is not entirely subsumed by a control 
perspective.  
Turning to the retributive side of the orthodox theory of punishment, there is a question about a 
doctrine that in its own terms sees itself as morally expressive and ethically linked to wrongfulness 
of action. What does a critic have to say of retributivism as the righting of wrongs, the addressing of 
affronts to human dignity? Such approaches ‘have the merit of integrating the symbolic, moral and 
affective dimension of punishment’, but ‘they describe an ideal world, which can be challenged with 
a reality principle’ (72). They also depend on power relations for their meanings, which change over 
time. There is of course truth in such criticism, but one wonders whether Fassin might want to say 
more about links between an admittedly ideal ethical theory and the trace of moral reform he sees 
in the theological-juridical world. This provides the possibility of moral, educational and social 
dimensions to punishment through rehabilitation, but it is surely linked to ethically redemptive 
elements in retributive theory. Fassin does not pursue such a line. He would rather leave this world 
of orthodox explanations behind in favour of a Nietzschean view  where we are no longer concerned 
with ‘the pure realm of ideas and the law but in the impure region of the obscure motives of crime 
and punishment’ (72).  
We find ourselves leaving the world of Bentham and Kant for that of Dostoevsky (72), though we 
might think that Dostoevsky also had some things to say about rehabilitation, retribution, and the 
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role of the theological in the juridical. In drawing on Nietzsche, however, Fassin takes us in a 
different direction. Returning to his earlier view that the police use their ‘discretionary power to call 
to social order the purportedly dangerous classes’, while the judiciary operate ‘an expanding culture 
of severity in criminal courts under the pressure of successive governments’ (80), Fassin considers 
the non-rational aspects of punishment, which also go beyond the standard grounds, though 
arguably in a different direction. Here, he is on Durkheimian ground, though Durkheim suggests ‘the 
pleasure in the infliction of pain, but does not name it’ (81).  Nietzsche does name it, as the 
‘voluptuous’ pleasure of doing bad things for their own sake. To punish is not just ‘to return evil for 
evil’, but ‘to produce a gratuitous suffering, which adds to the sanction, for the mere satisfaction of 
knowing that the culprit suffers’ (81). There is a ‘drive, more or less repressed, to make suffer, which 
society tends to delegate to certain institutions and professions’ (81), and here Fassin focuses on the 
prison as a place of punitive excess. 
In a powerful section, Fassin illustrates what we might call the persecutory function of modern 
punishment, with the kind of cruelty that goes on behind prison doors. This is an opaque and 
impenetrable world where ‘neglect, abuse, brutality, and even torture’ (83) occur with impunity. It is 
normal to portray the multiple abuses that ensue as one scandal after another, where each case is 
confined to its own terms, and responsibility is focused on individuals or individual institutions. But 
when the system continues to ignore its own responsibilities for seemingly disparate events, abuse 
becomes (pace Hart) a backhanded part of the punishment, leading to a widespread complicity. 
When judges continue to send people to prison, ‘their decision entails much more than a deprivation 
of liberty, and they cannot not know it’ (83). Society cannot ignore its own responsibility, for it 
authorises these uncorrected abuses by default and ‘perpetrates them by proxy’ (83). Punishment 
becomes ‘an almost unbounded power to punish, … an indefinite right to inflict suffering’ (84). The 
United States with mass incarceration becomes the exception which is also exemplary of the 
dynamics of western penality as a whole, and all this is enhanced by public media access to punitive 
systems that becomes ‘a contemporary form of pornography,… an ambiguous excitement at the 
sight of people suffering….’ (85). This dark, persecutory, side of punishment is always there as its 
shadowy supplement, its ‘accursed share’ (Bataille). Yet, as an aside, we might note that Fassin 
acknowledges that not every penal system tends towards the US model, and that, for example in 
European systems, some are more sensitive ‘to the need to ensure humanity in punishment’ (84), so 
the Nietzschean drive to sadism in punishment is not all there is. 
The final lecture, on who gets punished, recapitulates themes already developed concerning the 
blind eye turned to social inequality in a criminal justice system which focuses on the poor and 
marginalised but finds ways to deny or finesse the structural issues. At the core of orthodox penal 
theory lies the legal subject in whom responsibility for the crime is vested. This is first seen in the 
legal categories of mens rea and actus reus, but there is a further bind through individualisation of 
the sentence. While this might originally have been seen as a compassionate means of 
contextualising a bare legal responsibility, it has become a way of further singularising the individual, 
so that penal individualism and penal individualisation work together to desocialise crime (Norrie 
2014, ch 12). In the process, the social context becomes a means of risk assessment, and difficult 
social circumstances are seen not as deflecting the need to punish, but as incriminating the 
individual to a further degree. In the process, society absolves itself of its responsibility for the 
creation of criminogenic contexts, and the very idea of a social scientific understanding of the 
phenomenon of crime becomes attacked as a way of justifying criminal activity. The political 
accusation offers the advantage to those in power of evading their social accountability and 
legitimating their punitive policies. 
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Fassin asks how it could be that ‘at the very moment when social insecurity increases, crime wanes, 
and prisons fill, criticisms against social analysis and emphasis on individual liability become so 
preeminent’ (112). His answer reaches for a psychoanalytic term, disavowal, the ‘rejection of a 
reality that would be unbearable to admit’ (112). Modern democracies with their overleaping penal 
policies are in denial of just how much the crime problem is a kind of social equivalent of an auto-
immune disease, something that society does to itself. But what underlies this? Fassin will not go too 
deeply into a psychoanalytic understanding, for there is, he says, no more a Freudian social 
unconscious than there is a Durkheimian collective consciousness (112). Yet, there is this striking 
phenomenon of disavowal, and we also saw that Fassin identifies a level of non-rational affect that is 
simply the pleasure in seeing others suffer. Fassin gets at this through Nietzsche, but whence come 
these phenomena if not from some deep-seated psychological elements in the modern human 
mind? If there is no collective social unconscious, there are nonetheless psychological, affective, 
states which get expressed at the social level in consistent, patterned, recognisable ways. We can 
identify structural mechanisms, social practices, ethical outlooks and affective dispositions which 
cohere. The chain of connections is from a social logic of class and ethnic inequality, marginalisation 
and conflict to an ethical logic of separation, a negative othering of the marginalised, and then to a 
psychological logic of fear, anger and hate which enjoys seeing the negatively othered getting ‘what 
they deserve’. We should perhaps avoid the a priori diagnosis of collective, psychological, 
phenomena, but I doubt we can avoid the a posteriori identification of systemic patterns of 
psychological affect in social and historical contexts. 
The Social and the Psychological 
The contrast between a juridical framing of a social practice and the social context in which it 
operates is a key critical theme, but critical theory would not have got very far if it only replicated 
the best of television drama on the subject to hand. Giving the social context an historical dimension 
and showing how the legal form discloses hidden ethical and affective dimensions takes us further, 
and this is Fassin’s route with his emphasis on both the theological trace in punishment and the 
persecutory impulse identified by Nietzsche. The latter is the glaringly obvious conclusion to draw 
from current penal trends as they affect the policing of marginalised groups and the increase in 
punishments and prison numbers. The former exists as an ongoing trace to seek to moralise, to 
redeem, to make better. No doubt this trend is under threat, and no doubt also, it can be seen as the 
apologetic surface which hides the persecutory essence, but it also seems to be an important 
element, separate from and irreducible to persecution. Perhaps we could say that the dominant 
thrust of modern penality is towards the persecutory, but a desire to humanise remains, albeit one 
that is contained within overall system impulses: persecutory in the major, reformative in the minor 
key. 
How should we account for these different directions underlying the juridical mechanisms of 
punishment, and pushing them mainly in one direction, but not exclusively so? How can punishment 
embody the persecutory impulse and the humanising trace? The route to an answer is suggested in 
my comments above about the need to understand human psychology, and how it informs affective 
attitudes in particular ethical settings and social contexts. Here, I conclude simply by indicating how 
this might go. In Melanie Klein’s work, we find reference to two positions in the development of the 
infant personality, the ‘paranoid-schizoid’ and the ‘depressive’. The first is the basis for a 
persecutory affective state, which focuses hate and the wish to destroy on objects which the infant 
fails to see as a whole (Klein, 1946/ 1997; Reeves, 2019). In a world split between the definitively 
good and the irretrievably bad, the latter should be annihilated. The second position evolves from 
the first as the infant comes to see that the irretrievably bad object was in fact just one facet of a 
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more complex being, and that the bad should be understood alongside the good in whole objects 
(Klein, 1935/ 1998). In this position, the infant is troubled that it may have wished to destroy, and 
may have destroyed, objects it took to be all bad, but which it now realises are those that, in their 
wholeness, it really loves. It therefore develops a desire to repair and restore relationships it fears it 
may have destroyed (Klein, 1937/ 1998). 
Klein’s point was that the two early psychological positions remain within the human psyche in adult 
life, and that the more social and pacific depressive state is best maintained in stable social contexts 
which do not generate too much anxiety. Modern society is no doubt an anxious place, and modern 
penality already majors in persecutory othering. Klein seems a good resource for understanding a 
human psychology that finds persecutory othering an attractive affective state in the Nietzschean 
manner. At the same time the theological trace in modern punishment perhaps suggests a better, 
healthier, psychological position, akin to Klein’s depressive state, that could seek to humanise and 
reform, treating the other as a whole object.  
The argument could be taken further into Freudian metapsychology, where it is possible to identify 
different understandings of guilt in Freud himself, suggesting, as in Klein, primitive and mature 
psychic states (Norrie, 2018). The early form of guilt is based on introjected fear of, and anger 
towards, the father/ parent, which animates a harsh and repressive superego with persecutory 
functions (Freud, 1930/ 1985). In the mature form, guilt is based upon ideals that the psyche has 
evolved in relations with good parent figures, and what Hans Loewald (1980, 394) calls the sense of 
the superego as an atonement structure. Breaking with parent figures in the Oedipal struggle leads 
to a coherent sense of self in the superego, but this leaves the self regretful at having displaced 
those that it loves. The moment is foundational for the desire to return to an earlier wholeness that 
carries the child through its life, and makes it seek reconciliation with others. This involves 
atonement in its original meaning, a sense of at-one-ment (Morris, 1976, 100), that the self wants to 
retrieve, and this wish is a basis for mature guilt. 
There is of course much more to say, but I only wish to indicate how a critical criminal justice project 
might think through problems of persecutory excess and of the religious trace in penality, and how 
these sit in a social-historical setting. This is not a means of seeking to create a collective social 
unconscious, or deflecting attention from the social grounds of penality, especially as these reveal a 
social logic that is repressive and persecutory. It is to add a psychological dimension to the social 
which can explain and ground the hidden impulse and trace in penality. It is only to ask where the 
desire to hurt and to be nasty to others comes from, and how they might be part of the human 
psyche. At the same time, it is to think, at the level of human psychology, if there are other, better, 
healthier ways to be than angry, hateful and malicious, though the possibilities for so being require 
ongoing attention to the overall social context. 
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